Beyond Brotherhood: The Strategic Imperative for a Türkiye-Pakistan Mutual Defence Pact

Syed Raza Abbas and Fizza Jabbar, SVI (Strategic Vision Institute )

The relations between Pakistan and Turkiye have been described as “Two Nations One Soul“. There is no denying the fact that both nations share linguistic, cultural, and civilizational affinities but the rapidly evolving regional geopolitics demands more than just symbolic rhetoric. Pakistan-Türkiye relations are unique and exceptional in nature and can be termed “maximalist,“ as both nations seek maximum benefits from their strategic partnership. Pakistan have inducted Turkish Milgem Class Corvettes, integrated numerous unmanned aerial systems into its defensive arsenal, and the project of coproducing a 5^th generation fighter aircraft, these achievements are operationally remarkable. To transition from project-based cooperation to long term strategic engagement there is a requirement for a mutually binding defense pact. The pact Islamabad and Ankara will not solely focus on joint defense production but can also include regional connectivity projects and enhancement of bilateral trade.

To materialise this institutional framework, the Saudi-Pakistan model can be replicated. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a bilateral defence protocol in 1982; under the pact, Pakistan provided military expertise and a security presence, while the Saudis provided Pakistan with economic buffers during tumultuous times. The pact between Ankara and Islamabad doesn't necessarily need to be of a Saudi nature, but the model provides a good benchmark. The challenges both countries face are almost identical: asymmetric threats from non-state actors, terrorism, refugee influx, symmetric threats from state actors, and various non-traditional threats. Based on the shared threat perceptions and challenges, the pact would provide a much-needed respite, extended footprint, and complement regional stability in an evolving geopolitical landscape.

The recently formalised Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) between Islamabad and Riyadh can also be extended, as its efficacy has been tested in the ongoing war between the US and Iran. The number of Iranian missiles and drones which targeted Saudi Arabia was lower than in the neighbouring GCC states. Pakistan has open diplomatic channels with both Iran and Saudi Arabia; through these channels, Pakistan communicated its intent to Iranian officials about the potential triggering of SMDA in case of indiscriminate attacks on Saudi territory.

The strategic dividends of this pact for Türkiye would be multifold; under the doctrine of “Strategic Autonomy“ and “Mavi Watan“ (Blue Homeland), Ankara is actively seeking to extend its influence beyond its peripheries into Central, Western, and South Asia. Pakistan has active geopolitical stakes in these regions and, more specifically, can provide Ankara with an opening into South Asia and the northern Indian Ocean. Furthermore, the pact would bridge the pivotal regions of Western and Southern Asia, elevating the strategic weight of both Pakistan and Türkiye.

This pact would also create an opportunity and mechanism for both countries to peg their defence industries to extract maximum benefits. Türkiye has a robust defence and aerospace industry, with exports exceeding $10.5 billion in 2025. Pakistan, meanwhile, features a rapidly expanding and developing defence industry securing deals worth $10 billion in 2025. The notable consumers include Iraq, Azerbaijan, Sudan, and Libya. The current model of joint defence production between the two nations is vulnerable to shifting geopolitical winds. A formalised defence pact would legalise long-term joint research and development, institutionalised bilateral exchanges, and technology transfer. By pegging the defence sectors together, both countries can scale up investment in major programs, such as the KAAN fifth-generation fighter aircraft and advanced naval platforms, transitioning from simply buying hardware to co-producing next-generation platforms. The pact could also be extended beyond hard security to geoeconomic integration.

Both Pakistan and Türkiye are working on ambitious connectivity projects, such as the Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul (ITI) transnational corridor, China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and Hejaz Railway Project. Both nations can align their connectivity projects, as in the defence industry, with the geoeconomic integration of pivotal regions. The defence pact would provide a much-needed security umbrella to these connectivity projects and shield them from threats. A formalised defence pact will certainly increase the bilateral trade volume, ensuring that economic integration keeps pace with the military cooperation.

Sceptics of this pact will most certainly argue about Türkiye's commitments to the NATO alliance and the potential triggering of Article 5, which calls for collective defence. Critics may argue that Ankara’s defence pact with Islamabad risks unnecessarily entangling a NATO ally in the South Asian flashpoint. But these arguments are baseless, since NATO statutes and international defence diplomacy doesn’t prohibit bilateral defence arrangements. It is evident from Türkiye’s own “Shusha“ declaration with Azerbaijan, a pact that assures Baku of mutual defence assistance without triggering broader NATO involvement at the Caucasus flashpoint. Pakistan-Türkiye defence pact can be meticulously focused on territorial integrity, joint defence production, counter-terrorism, and ensuring the security of connectivity projects for broader geo-economic integration. This will ensure that neither state is entangled in the other’s localised, low-intensity conflicts, unless explicitly triggered by major state aggression. The pact can be kept strictly defensive and a stabilizing mechanism in order to maintain respective multilateral obligations, while keep their bilateral cooperation under the pact.

In an increasingly complex geopolitical atmosphere and the ruptured global order, to rely solely on historical and civilizational affinities is not enough. Regional stability and integration can only be achieved through resilient and legally binding infrastructures and agreements. Through this defence pact both Ankara and Islamabad can deal with mutual security threats, sustain joint defense production, ensure the continuity of regional connectivity projects, and extract maximum benefits from their bilateral relations.

Author: Syed Raza Abbas, Research Officer at SVI. Areas of interest include Iranian politics, Proxy networks, and its nuclear weapon program. The author also focuses on the security issues of the Middle East.
Co-author: Fizza Jabbar is a Research Intern at SVI, pursuing her Bachelor’s degree in Strategic Studies from Quaid e Azam University, Islamabad.