Cooperative Semiconductors Development and Sovereignty: Considerations for Türkiye

Abstract:

Semiconductors (and computer chips) are essential for many electronics, development of the Information and Technology (IT) industry as well as Artificial Intelligence (AI) to Electric Vehicles (EV) and Drones. Maintaining a stable chip design and manufacturing capacity is essential to address potential vulnerabilities. For countries seeking to maintain strategic and geopolitical relevance as well as national technological sovereignty. The economic rivalry between the United States and China over rare earth minerals and international trade has also affected the access of semiconductors (and computer chips technology). Countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, that are either already manufacturing semiconductors, find it increasingly challenging to balance the United States and China, while maintaining technological sovereignty. Furthermore, other aspiring countries now see the importance of developing their own semiconductors production capacity as a key aspect of maintaining national technological sovereignty. The article makes certain strategic considerations for Turkiye, and especially comparing to what India has been doing in recent years, contrasting it to the model of China, and suggesting that why a ‘cooperative model’ such as India’s, is relevant for Türkiye.

Turkish analysis, accepts and expands on the need to develop national technological capacity as a consequence of the current global debates on the U.S.–China rivalry. Europe’s struggles, and the fragility of global supply chains were visible over the last decade, and accentuated since the Covid-19 Pandemic. It is hence accepted that developing Türkiye’s development of national technologies such as drones, Artificial Intelligence (AI), and national semiconductor capacity is not a luxury but a necessity — both for sovereignty and for balancing between East and West. Therefore, the arguments put forth by Akıllı & Shukurti Özdemir (2025), that Türkiye is developing its national technology not only for economic advantages, but also for enhancing foreign policy position in an increasingly ‘technopolar’ world order is accepted as relevant. Hence this article further adds a discussion on how to further develop national production capacity, especially for semiconductors. The ‘cooperative’ approach could be a more relevant option for Türkiye, rather than an ‘autarky-seeking’ perspective. Particularly the case of India is analyzed, contrasted with China’s approach, and discussed as a model that develops technology through international cooperation and partnerships.

Semiconductors are much in demand in an increasingly digitalizing world. Semiconductors, small chips with billions of transistors, are key components for several industries such as drones, artificial intelligence (AI), telecommunications, defense systems, satellites, energy grids, electric vehicles (EV), and many more. Because of their importance, semiconductors are key components of increasingly digitalizing global economy, and set the foundations of technological sovereignty.

For the purpose of this article, Technological Sovereignty, is accepted as a sovereign and independent nation’s ability to produce the main technological components necessary to allow major industries and the overall economy to function without significant interruptions.

March & Schieferdecker (2023), describe Technological Sovereignty as an economic and industrial ability. March & Schieferdecker (2023) further suggest that technological sovereignty doesn’t necessarily mean seeking “autarky.“ Autarky, attempts to manufacture most products domestically, without dependence on significant foreign import. Autarky may often lead to resource nationalism. By contrast, technological sovereignty, aims to reduce the “vulnerabilities“ of certain key technologies. March & Schieferdecker still see an important role of international cooperation and trade to enhance technological sovereignty understood as an ability, and by contrast consider autarky as potentially detrimental to technological sovereignty.

Türkiye’s Technology Leap is important, and yet it should be interpreted as a step for sovereignty enhancement rather than autarky-seeking. For Türkiye’s, Millî Teknoloji Hamlesi (National Technology Leap), semiconductors represent both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge lies in the country’s heavy reliance on imported chips. The opportunity lies in using strategic investment, partnerships, and industrial policy to transform this vulnerability into a potential strength by promoting capacity to produce components for key technologies.

Türkiye is a NATO member, and has a Customs Union agreement with the European Union (EU). Furthermore, Türkiye has time and again affirmed that Turkiye is a member of the European Environment Agency, and will also undergo a green economy transition that is compliant to t the standards of the EU’s Green Deal. Considering Türkiye’s general alighnment with European Union rules and regulations, a cooperative model is arguably more appropriate. For instance, India’s semiconductor program is focusing on attracting foreign partners and investors; thus a cooperative and investor friendly approach. Türkiye can draw lessons from the Indian experience.

Although the examples from South Asia and the Indo-Pacific region, are valuable, yet due to the rules and regulations of European institutions (including compliance to certain environmental standards) and considering Türkiye’s institutional ties to European economies, not all of the cases are applicable for Türkiye.

As a relevant example, for instance, India has turned chip production into a national mission, combining public subsidies and international partnerships. India’s strategy involves long-term planning. Türkiye needs semiconductors to achieve a national drive for technology. Without indigenous chip capabilities, Türkiye may face risks remaining an importer of semiconductors (chips), in a world where digital dependence.

Considering Türkiye’s integration with NATO, OECD and EU economies, contrary to China’s strongly domestic production focus, Türkiye can adopt a more long-term and ‘cooperative’ model that seeks to attract foreign direct investors as part of its national technology drive. a model of eventually developing semiconductor production capacity enhancement can also be possible through attracting foreign investments and international partners (a partnership model). Through cooperation with international partners, Türkiye can attract more not only investments, but also know-how, which makes such ‘partnership model’ a more suitable model than an autarky seeking approach.

Hence the following section will discuss in more details the importance of semiconductors and technological sovereignty.

I. Semiconductors and Sovereignty

Semiconductors are the found for many technologies and digital infrastructure, communication networks, autonomous systems, defense electronics, energy grids, advanced sensors, electric vehicles (EVs), 3-D printers and Artificial Intelligence (AI). States cannot guarantee the operation of energy systems, digital infrastructure, their industry and their economy, nor even their defense capabilities.

Accessing semiconductors (chips) have become as vital as accessing water, energy resources, or rare earth minerals. Dominance over these technologies and resources is key for to technological or digital independence, hence for sovereignty.

The strategic significance of rare semiconductors, and rare earth minerals, are comparable to petroleum since 1973. Following the oil shocks, the International Energy Agency was established and has since been requiring member states to stock strategic oil reserves.

The semiconductor shortages of the 2020s, in a similar fashion to the 1970’s oil shortage, posed challenges to other industries. Challenges to accessing critical technological components (as well as rare earth minerals), are teaching us the dangers of digital dependence, and overall the dangers and vulnerabilities of over-reliance to a single source of supply, or a single route.

Yet influential early work on interdependence had warned about vulnerabilities. The concept of complex interdependence in information age by Keohane and Nye (1998) was distinguishing sensitivities and vulnerabilities in economic interdependence. While Keohane and Nye are scholars known for their work on economic interdependence and cooperation, and warned against the perils of economic vulnerabilities to certain strategic imports or over-reliance to a particular type of resource.

Over the last decade, we can observe that while trying to de-couple from mutual economic over-dependence, the United States and China’s approach seem to have evolved to an increasingly more competitive global economic rivalry.

Wu (2020) demonstrated that the U.S.–China rivalry shifted from tariffs to technology. Access to technology and the ability to have safe and uninterrupted access to key components such as semiconductors, is essential to even further develop technological advantages.

The global semiconductor supply chain is complex and geographically concentrated on earth. Taiwan (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited – TSMC) produces over 90% of the world’s most advanced chips. Furthermore, even mainland China is relying on TSMC for the supply of chips. South Korea (Samsung, SK Hynix), is dominant in memory processor and storage devices, and chip manufacturer after Taiwan. The specialization on semiconductors is concentrated to OECD economies. This concentration is also the main reason why non-OECD countries such as China, India or Pakistan are aspiring to develop semiconductors, chips, and other technologies.

The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated that a disruption in one part, no matter how small a component it is, of the semiconductor production and supply chain can cause a halt at the global scale. Automakers for instance, faced significant losses and delayed projects. Supply chain fragility was clearly revealed under the global pandemic and also with supply chain disruption fragility revealed with the Ever Given accident.

For the case of Türkiye, developing such a capacity would be a strategic advantage as a way to reduce vulnerabilities.Yet Türkiye should use the advantage of being member of Western institutions such as OECD and NATO to attract foreign investors. Therefore, Türkiye’s economic model should be more compatible with a ‘cooperative model’ arguably adapted by India, rather than the strongly ‘national’ model of China.

For Türkiye, observing these key takeaways from the case of India, are relevant. Domestic efforts must integrate into a patient yet consistent, sustainable and comprehensive national strategy. As in the example of Fraunhofer FIT 2025 as a clear form of India-Germany cooperation (a type of cooperative partnership). Türkiye can and should promote similar collaboration initiatives with OECD economies. It may take time to make significant achievements in producing semiconductors, but the impatience would be a worse mistake.

A key discussion in this article, centers on Türkiye’s need of achieving a national technology leap while cooperating with international partners (cooperative partnership) in that process. The rhetoric of achieving national technology should not be confused with autarky; which inevitably is often linked with resource nationalism. For most countries, even those that have vast territories, it is very difficult to achieve an entirely self-sustaining economic production capacity. It is particularly difficult to do so without controlling global resources in a neo-colonialist or neo-imperialist manner. Autarky, in most cases, is not a realistic option, and furthermore, it runs counter to the concept of promoting international economic cooperation. Promoting economic cooperation and international partnerships have been a key aspect of Turkish foreign. Hence, Türkiye needs to consider many factors in its current position and how both the opportunities and vulnerabilities could be addressed.