India's Post-Conflict Approach to Iran:
Between BRICS Ambitions, Türkiye's Strategic Relevance, and a Crowded Playing Field
Ali Oğuz DİRİÖZ
Strategic Outlook for TSM | May 2026
When silence fell over the Strait of Hormuz and Washington and Tehran reached an uneasy ceasefire in April 2026, India wasted little time. India's Foreign Minister was in Abu Dhabi reviewing the strategic partnership with the United Arab Emirates. Medical shipments to Iran had been dispatched. Senior Indian officials were quietly signalling to Tehran that New Delhi was prepared to play a larger role — not only as a trade partner, but also as a potential peace facilitator, reconstruction broker, and connectivity actor.
India's ambitions in post-conflict Iran are layered, and not without contradiction. Its posture is better understood as a broader strategic approach: one that brings together energy security, Global South diplomacy, BRICS, the New Development Bank, Gulf partnerships, and — increasingly — the need to develop underexploited relationships with important regional powers such as Türkiye.
To understand this approach, one must read three maps simultaneously. The first is the map of India's self-proclaimed leadership of the Global South. The second is the map of institutional power inside BRICS and the New Development Bank, where China's shadow remains long and heavy. The third is the map of regional connectivity stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Gulf, Iran, Türkiye, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and Europe. It is on this third map that Türkiye's importance becomes especially clear.
India's post-conflict approach to Iran will test whether its Global South leadership is of genuine substance — or merely a diplomatic narrative.
The Global South Card
India has invested considerable diplomatic capital in positioning itself as the authentic voice of the developing world. Its G20 presidency in 2023 cemented this narrative. The India-Africa Forum Summit process, rice aid shipments to African partners, development assistance to smaller neighbours, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi's outreach to the Gulf and the wider Global South all feed the same story: India as a stabilising, responsible power that delivers without the conditionalities attached to Western finance or the opacity often associated with Chinese infrastructure deals.
Post-conflict Iran offers India a stage on which to advance this role. Iran needs reconstruction capital, pharmaceutical supplies, medical equipment, energy-sector investment, and above all a credible path back to normality in energy exports, insurance, shipping, and port operations. India, which maintained a carefully calibrated diplomatic posture during the crisis, is well placed to present itself as a pragmatic actor trusted by multiple sides.
For India, Chabahar remains the symbolic and practical anchor of this strategy. The port is not merely a commercial facility. It is a strategic corridor linking India to Afghanistan, Central Asia, and potentially the broader Eurasian landmass. A stable post-conflict Iran that welcomes Indian infrastructure investment could therefore be transformational for Indian connectivity ambitions. The logic is compelling. The execution, however, will be considerably harder.
BRICS and the NDB: Useful Tools, Complicated Architecture
India will naturally seek to use multilateral institutions it considers friendly — especially BRICS and the New Development Bank — to support Iran's reconstruction and reintegration. The NDB, headquartered in Shanghai and originally capitalised by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, was designed to finance infrastructure in emerging economies outside the strictures of the Washington Consensus. Iran's formal entry into BRICS in 2024 gives New Delhi a plausible institutional framework through which to advocate for post-conflict reconstruction financing.
The appeal is obvious. The NDB carries the legitimacy of a multilateral institution while being less politically toxic in Tehran than the World Bank or IMF, both of which remain associated in Iranian political memory with Western-dominated economic governance. India, as a founding BRICS member and major shareholder, can credibly argue for Iranian infrastructure, energy, transport, and health-sector projects.
But institutional arithmetic in BRICS and the NDB is in a situation where India is not the only dominant economic force. Contractors, state banks, logistics companies, and energy firms from the different BRICS economies have been positioning for moments such as reconstruction efforts in places like Iran and the Gulf.
BRICS and the NDB are still useful institutional platforms for developing new logistics as well as reconstruction and develomebr of Iran or other states. However, they are not platforms dominated by one power alone. Every initiative inside these bodies must be negotiated with the preferences, interests, expectations, and the political sensitivities of all the members.
Türkiye's pursuit of full BRICS membership has itself been a complicated and delayed process, underscoring that the grouping is a contested diplomatic arena rather than a neutral multilateral space.
BRICS and the NDB are genuinely useful frameworks, but they do not automatically result in strong projects for reconstruction and development.
Looking Beyond the Multilateral Lane
It is precisely this BRICS constraint that explains why Indian diplomacy in the post-conflict moment is diversified. New Delhi is not placing all its reconstruction bets on a single multilateral table.
The European Union matters more than it may initially appear. The EU-India strategic partnership has expanded steadily in areas such as trade, digital infrastructure, clean energy, technology, and supply-chain resilience. A post-conflict Iran that cautiously seeks reintegration into international markets offers India and the EU a shared interest: ensuring that Iranian reconstruction does not become a purely Sino-Russian project.
India is better placed than many Western actors to serve as an interface with Tehran. It has preserved diplomatic channels with Iran, maintained strategic autonomy in relation to Russia, cultivated ties with the Gulf monarchies, and avoided being perceived as a purely Western-aligned actor. This gives India a diplomatic flexibility that Europe alone often lacks.
Yet even this EU-India dimension is insufficient without regional partners that can physically, commercially, and politically connect the relevant geographies. This is where Türkiye belongs — much closer to the centre of the analysis.
Türkiye: The Underexploited Partnership
Türkiye's position deserves particular attention in any serious assessment of India's post-conflict Iran approach. Ankara and New Delhi have historically under-traded their genuine complementarity. The relationship has too often been constrained by political disagreements while the deeper structural logic for cooperation has remained underdeveloped.
This is a missed opportunity, because Türkiye and India are not peripheral to one another's strategic futures. Both are large, diversified economies with significant manufacturing capacity. Both seek greater autonomy in foreign policy. Both maintain strong ties with the Gulf and are active in Central Asia. Both are interested in connectivity, logistics, defence-industrial capacity, energy security, and resilient supply chains. Both have global diplomatic ambitions and complex relationships with the West — Türkiye as a NATO member with a distinct regional posture, India as a leading voice of the Global South.
Recent signals suggest that the two countries are beginning to move beyond a difficult period of diplomatic tension toward a more constructive footing. This is a significant development, indicating that both Ankara and New Delhi may be recognising the opportunity costs of allowing bilateral relations to remain constrained by factors that need not define the partnership's full potential.
Türkiye's geographic position is decisive. It sits at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, the Black Sea, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Any serious conversation about post-conflict Iran, Chabahar, the International North-South Transport Corridor, the Gulf, the Organization of Turkic States, or alternative Eurasian connectivity routes must eventually include Türkiye. Ankara is a corridor state, a NATO member, a Black Sea power, a Middle Eastern actor, and an increasingly influential regional diplomatic force.
For Türkiye, cooperation with India in relation to Iran's reconstruction could serve several interests simultaneously. It could diversify Ankara's Asian partnerships beyond China and Russia. It could strengthen Türkiye's claim to be a practical connectivity hub between Asia and Europe. It could support Turkish construction, logistics, health, defence, and energy firms in post-conflict reconstruction markets. It could also provide a constructive channel for Türkiye to deepen engagement with South Asia on terms that go beyond narrow bilateral disputes.
For India, Türkiye offers equally important advantages: access to European markets, NATO-linked political networks, Turkish contractors with deep experience in the Middle East and Eurasia, and a state capable of communicating with Iran, the Gulf, Russia, Ukraine, Europe, and Central Asian actors. Türkiye also provides a bridge to the Organization of Turkic States, which matters for India's long-term ambitions in Central Asia.
This is not to suggest that Türkiye and India will suddenly become strategic allies. Their disagreements are real and non-negligible. But the relationship is underexploited, not structurally impossible. A pragmatic agenda could begin with trade facilitation, port logistics, pharmaceuticals, construction, digital infrastructure, renewable energy, higher education, tourism, and trilateral business forums involving Gulf partners. Iran's reconstruction could become one of the key practical theatres in which such cooperation is tested and developed.
Türkiye and India do not need full strategic alignment to cooperate. They need a pragmatic agenda, political maturity, and the willingness to prevent third-party disputes from monopolising the relationship.
Türkiye After the Iran Conflict: A Regional Powerbroker in the Making
The Iran conflict has reinforced that Türkiye's relevance in Middle Eastern diplomacy is growing, not diminishing. Ankara's choices in the post-conflict environment could influence whether the region moves toward stabilisation or renewed fragmentation. This matters directly for India.
For India, this means Türkiye should not be viewed solely through any single bilateral prism. A more mature Indian approach would recognise Türkiye as a multi-regional actor whose cooperation could help advance India's own connectivity, energy, and Eurasian strategies.
Equally, Türkiye should not view India only through narrow regional lenses. India is one of the world's largest economies, a major technology and pharmaceutical power, a key energy consumer, a central Indo-Pacific actor, and an increasingly influential voice in the Global South. A Türkiye that seeks diversified partnerships across Asia cannot afford to keep India at arm's length.
The Gulf, Iran, and the Connectivity Triangle
The UAE and the wider Gulf are central to this emerging picture. India's strategic partnership with the UAE has deepened rapidly, covering trade, energy, logistics, investment, digital payments, food security, and diaspora ties. Türkiye has similarly repaired and strengthened its relations with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf actors after a period of turbulence.
This creates meaningful space for triangular or minilateral cooperation. India, Türkiye, and Gulf capital could jointly contribute to post-conflict Iranian reconstruction in sectors where political sensitivities are manageable: hospitals, pharmaceuticals, port logistics, renewable energy, food supply chains, water infrastructure, and transport corridors. Such cooperation would not replace BRICS or the NDB but would supplement them with more flexible, project-based coalitions.
The India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) has attracted considerable attention, though Türkiye has been sceptical of architectures that bypass it. Ankara has promoted alternatives such as the Development Road Project through Iraq, the revival of historic rail links, and the Middle Corridor. Rather than treating these visions as mutually exclusive, India and Türkiye could explore how different corridors might become complementary. A post-conflict Iran adds further complexity, but also further opportunity. Chabahar, the Gulf, Iraq, Türkiye, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia could be connected through multiple overlapping routes rather than a single exclusive mega-corridor. Strategic imagination is required — and the diplomatic will to exercise it.
The Hormuz Lesson
The conflict around the Strait of Hormuz reinforced a lesson India already understood: energy security cannot be outsourced to others. India's deep exposure to Gulf energy flows makes the stability of Hormuz a direct national interest. Any disruption affects Indian inflation, current-account stability, shipping insurance, industrial production, and household welfare.
India has spent years diversifying its energy sources, expanding strategic reserves, cultivating ties with Gulf producers, maintaining Russian supplies, and strengthening its foreign-exchange buffers. These preparations helped India absorb pressure during the crisis. But the experience also demonstrated that economic resilience depends on diplomatic depth. Energy security is not only about barrels and tankers — it is also about relationships, ports, corridors, currencies, insurance, naval posture, and political trust.
Post-conflict Iran is therefore the next chapter of the same story. India will seek to expand Chabahar, preserve Iranian goodwill, advocate reconstruction financing, provide pharmaceuticals and technical expertise, and position itself as the Global South's honest broker. But it will have to do so while competing quietly with China inside BRICS, navigating Russian interests, working constructively with the Gulf, maintaining Western channels, and developing the still-underexploited potential of the Türkiye-India relationship.
Conclusion
India's post-conflict approach to Iran will test whether its Global South leadership is of genuine substance.
The smarter path is multidirectional. India should use BRICS and the NDB where useful, but not become dependent on them. It should deepen cooperation with the EU without appearing as a Western proxy. It should preserve Iranian trust without ignoring Gulf concerns. Above all, it should invest in underexploited partnerships with states such as Türkiye, whose geography, diplomatic reach, industrial base, and Eurasian networks make it indispensable to any serious post-conflict regional strategy.
For Türkiye, the opportunity is equally significant. A more constructive relationship with India would strengthen Ankara's Asian outreach under the Asia Anew Initiative, diversify its partnerships, support its corridor diplomacy, and open new economic opportunities in reconstruction, logistics, technology, and energy. Türkiye and India do not need full strategic alignment to cooperate — they need a pragmatic agenda, political maturity, and the discipline to prevent third-party disputes from monopolising the relationship.
The Strait of Hormuz is open again. But the real competition for influence in the post-conflict Middle East has only just begun. In that competition, India's success will depend not only on Chabahar, BRICS, or the NDB. And in the process, New Delhi can engage with Türkiye as a partner in the emerging Eurasian and Middle Eastern order.
References and Further Reading
1. Iran looks to India for bigger role as peace negotiator — Times of Oman / News18, April 2026
2. Exclusive: Chabahar project on track despite sanctions, Iran reassures India — CNBC TV18, April 2026
3. The Stabiliser of South Asia: The Iran War Has Enhanced India's Political Influence — Open The Magazine, April 2026
4. RBI's Digital Currency Proposal for the BRICS 2026 Agenda — Modern Diplomacy, April 2026
5. South Korea's Renewed Strategic Pivot to India — The Diplomat, April 2026
6. EU-India Renewed Strategic Partnership and Its Significance in the Shifting Global Landscape — Robert Schuman Foundation
7. India-UAE Ties Deepen Amidst Middle East Turmoil — Middle East Forum, April 2026
8. India's Forex Reserves Near $700 Billion Amid US-Iran Tensions — Indian News Network, April 2026
9. India-Africa Ties Signal Stability in a Turbulent World — The Hindu, April 2026
10. Diplomacy in Motion: India's Gulf Calculus Amid Regional Crisis — Modern Diplomacy, April 2026
Strategic Outlook for TSM | May 2026
When silence fell over the Strait of Hormuz and Washington and Tehran reached an uneasy ceasefire in April 2026, India wasted little time. India's Foreign Minister was in Abu Dhabi reviewing the strategic partnership with the United Arab Emirates. Medical shipments to Iran had been dispatched. Senior Indian officials were quietly signalling to Tehran that New Delhi was prepared to play a larger role — not only as a trade partner, but also as a potential peace facilitator, reconstruction broker, and connectivity actor.
India's ambitions in post-conflict Iran are layered, and not without contradiction. Its posture is better understood as a broader strategic approach: one that brings together energy security, Global South diplomacy, BRICS, the New Development Bank, Gulf partnerships, and — increasingly — the need to develop underexploited relationships with important regional powers such as Türkiye.
To understand this approach, one must read three maps simultaneously. The first is the map of India's self-proclaimed leadership of the Global South. The second is the map of institutional power inside BRICS and the New Development Bank, where China's shadow remains long and heavy. The third is the map of regional connectivity stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Gulf, Iran, Türkiye, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and Europe. It is on this third map that Türkiye's importance becomes especially clear.
India's post-conflict approach to Iran will test whether its Global South leadership is of genuine substance — or merely a diplomatic narrative.
The Global South Card
India has invested considerable diplomatic capital in positioning itself as the authentic voice of the developing world. Its G20 presidency in 2023 cemented this narrative. The India-Africa Forum Summit process, rice aid shipments to African partners, development assistance to smaller neighbours, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi's outreach to the Gulf and the wider Global South all feed the same story: India as a stabilising, responsible power that delivers without the conditionalities attached to Western finance or the opacity often associated with Chinese infrastructure deals.
Post-conflict Iran offers India a stage on which to advance this role. Iran needs reconstruction capital, pharmaceutical supplies, medical equipment, energy-sector investment, and above all a credible path back to normality in energy exports, insurance, shipping, and port operations. India, which maintained a carefully calibrated diplomatic posture during the crisis, is well placed to present itself as a pragmatic actor trusted by multiple sides.
For India, Chabahar remains the symbolic and practical anchor of this strategy. The port is not merely a commercial facility. It is a strategic corridor linking India to Afghanistan, Central Asia, and potentially the broader Eurasian landmass. A stable post-conflict Iran that welcomes Indian infrastructure investment could therefore be transformational for Indian connectivity ambitions. The logic is compelling. The execution, however, will be considerably harder.
BRICS and the NDB: Useful Tools, Complicated Architecture
India will naturally seek to use multilateral institutions it considers friendly — especially BRICS and the New Development Bank — to support Iran's reconstruction and reintegration. The NDB, headquartered in Shanghai and originally capitalised by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, was designed to finance infrastructure in emerging economies outside the strictures of the Washington Consensus. Iran's formal entry into BRICS in 2024 gives New Delhi a plausible institutional framework through which to advocate for post-conflict reconstruction financing.
The appeal is obvious. The NDB carries the legitimacy of a multilateral institution while being less politically toxic in Tehran than the World Bank or IMF, both of which remain associated in Iranian political memory with Western-dominated economic governance. India, as a founding BRICS member and major shareholder, can credibly argue for Iranian infrastructure, energy, transport, and health-sector projects.
But institutional arithmetic in BRICS and the NDB is in a situation where India is not the only dominant economic force. Contractors, state banks, logistics companies, and energy firms from the different BRICS economies have been positioning for moments such as reconstruction efforts in places like Iran and the Gulf.
BRICS and the NDB are still useful institutional platforms for developing new logistics as well as reconstruction and develomebr of Iran or other states. However, they are not platforms dominated by one power alone. Every initiative inside these bodies must be negotiated with the preferences, interests, expectations, and the political sensitivities of all the members.
Türkiye's pursuit of full BRICS membership has itself been a complicated and delayed process, underscoring that the grouping is a contested diplomatic arena rather than a neutral multilateral space.
BRICS and the NDB are genuinely useful frameworks, but they do not automatically result in strong projects for reconstruction and development.
Looking Beyond the Multilateral Lane
It is precisely this BRICS constraint that explains why Indian diplomacy in the post-conflict moment is diversified. New Delhi is not placing all its reconstruction bets on a single multilateral table.
The European Union matters more than it may initially appear. The EU-India strategic partnership has expanded steadily in areas such as trade, digital infrastructure, clean energy, technology, and supply-chain resilience. A post-conflict Iran that cautiously seeks reintegration into international markets offers India and the EU a shared interest: ensuring that Iranian reconstruction does not become a purely Sino-Russian project.
India is better placed than many Western actors to serve as an interface with Tehran. It has preserved diplomatic channels with Iran, maintained strategic autonomy in relation to Russia, cultivated ties with the Gulf monarchies, and avoided being perceived as a purely Western-aligned actor. This gives India a diplomatic flexibility that Europe alone often lacks.
Yet even this EU-India dimension is insufficient without regional partners that can physically, commercially, and politically connect the relevant geographies. This is where Türkiye belongs — much closer to the centre of the analysis.
Türkiye: The Underexploited Partnership
Türkiye's position deserves particular attention in any serious assessment of India's post-conflict Iran approach. Ankara and New Delhi have historically under-traded their genuine complementarity. The relationship has too often been constrained by political disagreements while the deeper structural logic for cooperation has remained underdeveloped.
This is a missed opportunity, because Türkiye and India are not peripheral to one another's strategic futures. Both are large, diversified economies with significant manufacturing capacity. Both seek greater autonomy in foreign policy. Both maintain strong ties with the Gulf and are active in Central Asia. Both are interested in connectivity, logistics, defence-industrial capacity, energy security, and resilient supply chains. Both have global diplomatic ambitions and complex relationships with the West — Türkiye as a NATO member with a distinct regional posture, India as a leading voice of the Global South.
Recent signals suggest that the two countries are beginning to move beyond a difficult period of diplomatic tension toward a more constructive footing. This is a significant development, indicating that both Ankara and New Delhi may be recognising the opportunity costs of allowing bilateral relations to remain constrained by factors that need not define the partnership's full potential.
Türkiye's geographic position is decisive. It sits at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, the Black Sea, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Any serious conversation about post-conflict Iran, Chabahar, the International North-South Transport Corridor, the Gulf, the Organization of Turkic States, or alternative Eurasian connectivity routes must eventually include Türkiye. Ankara is a corridor state, a NATO member, a Black Sea power, a Middle Eastern actor, and an increasingly influential regional diplomatic force.
For Türkiye, cooperation with India in relation to Iran's reconstruction could serve several interests simultaneously. It could diversify Ankara's Asian partnerships beyond China and Russia. It could strengthen Türkiye's claim to be a practical connectivity hub between Asia and Europe. It could support Turkish construction, logistics, health, defence, and energy firms in post-conflict reconstruction markets. It could also provide a constructive channel for Türkiye to deepen engagement with South Asia on terms that go beyond narrow bilateral disputes.
For India, Türkiye offers equally important advantages: access to European markets, NATO-linked political networks, Turkish contractors with deep experience in the Middle East and Eurasia, and a state capable of communicating with Iran, the Gulf, Russia, Ukraine, Europe, and Central Asian actors. Türkiye also provides a bridge to the Organization of Turkic States, which matters for India's long-term ambitions in Central Asia.
This is not to suggest that Türkiye and India will suddenly become strategic allies. Their disagreements are real and non-negligible. But the relationship is underexploited, not structurally impossible. A pragmatic agenda could begin with trade facilitation, port logistics, pharmaceuticals, construction, digital infrastructure, renewable energy, higher education, tourism, and trilateral business forums involving Gulf partners. Iran's reconstruction could become one of the key practical theatres in which such cooperation is tested and developed.
Türkiye and India do not need full strategic alignment to cooperate. They need a pragmatic agenda, political maturity, and the willingness to prevent third-party disputes from monopolising the relationship.
Türkiye After the Iran Conflict: A Regional Powerbroker in the Making
The Iran conflict has reinforced that Türkiye's relevance in Middle Eastern diplomacy is growing, not diminishing. Ankara's choices in the post-conflict environment could influence whether the region moves toward stabilisation or renewed fragmentation. This matters directly for India.
For India, this means Türkiye should not be viewed solely through any single bilateral prism. A more mature Indian approach would recognise Türkiye as a multi-regional actor whose cooperation could help advance India's own connectivity, energy, and Eurasian strategies.
Equally, Türkiye should not view India only through narrow regional lenses. India is one of the world's largest economies, a major technology and pharmaceutical power, a key energy consumer, a central Indo-Pacific actor, and an increasingly influential voice in the Global South. A Türkiye that seeks diversified partnerships across Asia cannot afford to keep India at arm's length.
The Gulf, Iran, and the Connectivity Triangle
The UAE and the wider Gulf are central to this emerging picture. India's strategic partnership with the UAE has deepened rapidly, covering trade, energy, logistics, investment, digital payments, food security, and diaspora ties. Türkiye has similarly repaired and strengthened its relations with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf actors after a period of turbulence.
This creates meaningful space for triangular or minilateral cooperation. India, Türkiye, and Gulf capital could jointly contribute to post-conflict Iranian reconstruction in sectors where political sensitivities are manageable: hospitals, pharmaceuticals, port logistics, renewable energy, food supply chains, water infrastructure, and transport corridors. Such cooperation would not replace BRICS or the NDB but would supplement them with more flexible, project-based coalitions.
The India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) has attracted considerable attention, though Türkiye has been sceptical of architectures that bypass it. Ankara has promoted alternatives such as the Development Road Project through Iraq, the revival of historic rail links, and the Middle Corridor. Rather than treating these visions as mutually exclusive, India and Türkiye could explore how different corridors might become complementary. A post-conflict Iran adds further complexity, but also further opportunity. Chabahar, the Gulf, Iraq, Türkiye, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia could be connected through multiple overlapping routes rather than a single exclusive mega-corridor. Strategic imagination is required — and the diplomatic will to exercise it.
The Hormuz Lesson
The conflict around the Strait of Hormuz reinforced a lesson India already understood: energy security cannot be outsourced to others. India's deep exposure to Gulf energy flows makes the stability of Hormuz a direct national interest. Any disruption affects Indian inflation, current-account stability, shipping insurance, industrial production, and household welfare.
India has spent years diversifying its energy sources, expanding strategic reserves, cultivating ties with Gulf producers, maintaining Russian supplies, and strengthening its foreign-exchange buffers. These preparations helped India absorb pressure during the crisis. But the experience also demonstrated that economic resilience depends on diplomatic depth. Energy security is not only about barrels and tankers — it is also about relationships, ports, corridors, currencies, insurance, naval posture, and political trust.
Post-conflict Iran is therefore the next chapter of the same story. India will seek to expand Chabahar, preserve Iranian goodwill, advocate reconstruction financing, provide pharmaceuticals and technical expertise, and position itself as the Global South's honest broker. But it will have to do so while competing quietly with China inside BRICS, navigating Russian interests, working constructively with the Gulf, maintaining Western channels, and developing the still-underexploited potential of the Türkiye-India relationship.
Conclusion
India's post-conflict approach to Iran will test whether its Global South leadership is of genuine substance.
The smarter path is multidirectional. India should use BRICS and the NDB where useful, but not become dependent on them. It should deepen cooperation with the EU without appearing as a Western proxy. It should preserve Iranian trust without ignoring Gulf concerns. Above all, it should invest in underexploited partnerships with states such as Türkiye, whose geography, diplomatic reach, industrial base, and Eurasian networks make it indispensable to any serious post-conflict regional strategy.
For Türkiye, the opportunity is equally significant. A more constructive relationship with India would strengthen Ankara's Asian outreach under the Asia Anew Initiative, diversify its partnerships, support its corridor diplomacy, and open new economic opportunities in reconstruction, logistics, technology, and energy. Türkiye and India do not need full strategic alignment to cooperate — they need a pragmatic agenda, political maturity, and the discipline to prevent third-party disputes from monopolising the relationship.
The Strait of Hormuz is open again. But the real competition for influence in the post-conflict Middle East has only just begun. In that competition, India's success will depend not only on Chabahar, BRICS, or the NDB. And in the process, New Delhi can engage with Türkiye as a partner in the emerging Eurasian and Middle Eastern order.
References and Further Reading
1. Iran looks to India for bigger role as peace negotiator — Times of Oman / News18, April 2026
2. Exclusive: Chabahar project on track despite sanctions, Iran reassures India — CNBC TV18, April 2026
3. The Stabiliser of South Asia: The Iran War Has Enhanced India's Political Influence — Open The Magazine, April 2026
4. RBI's Digital Currency Proposal for the BRICS 2026 Agenda — Modern Diplomacy, April 2026
5. South Korea's Renewed Strategic Pivot to India — The Diplomat, April 2026
6. EU-India Renewed Strategic Partnership and Its Significance in the Shifting Global Landscape — Robert Schuman Foundation
7. India-UAE Ties Deepen Amidst Middle East Turmoil — Middle East Forum, April 2026
8. India's Forex Reserves Near $700 Billion Amid US-Iran Tensions — Indian News Network, April 2026
9. India-Africa Ties Signal Stability in a Turbulent World — The Hindu, April 2026
10. Diplomacy in Motion: India's Gulf Calculus Amid Regional Crisis — Modern Diplomacy, April 2026
_jpeg_2025_22_12_b3702079-4965-4132-8c28-6f30c62c1513.jpeg "Defense, Security, and Intelligence Revolution: Technopolitics and Demopolitics")
![Synthetic Reality Technology (Deep Fake) [ BRAINS² Turkey * Implementation Program ]](/Files/Etkinlik/File/Afis/BTR_SGT_Kapak_jpg_4e530905-1d87-4385-a6f9-5d667da99637.jpg "Synthetic Reality Technology (Deep Fake) [ BRAINS² Turkey * Implementation Program ]")
