AFRICA 2063 DECLARATION
8TH TÜRKİYE - AFRICA DEFENCE SECURITY AND AEROSPACE FORUM
"African Security Architecture and Türkiye"
8th Türkiye-Africa Defence Security and Aerospace Forum was held as a co-event of the 11th Istanbul Security Conference organized by the TASAM National Defence and Security Institute on November 28, 2025, at the Wish More Hotel Istanbul, with the main theme of "African Security Architecture and Türkiye."
The forum featured speakers and protocol participants from various countries and regions, representing different fields and sectors. Diplomatic representatives and delegations from different countries also attended. Presentations and speeches were delivered by local and foreign experts, academics, and diplomats at the Forum. Relevant authorities from Türkiye, Asia, Europe, America, and Africa were also represented at the Forum, and all sessions were followed institutionally.
The following important topics were discussed at the forum: " Africa 2063 Security, Defence and Space Vision: Partnership Perspectives", " African Union s Artificial Intelligence Strategy", "African Maritime Security and Türkiye," " Turkish Military Presence and New Horizons in Somalia, Djibouti, Libya, Sudan, Central African Republic, and Mali“, " 4th Türkiye - Africa Partnership Summit: Perspectives on Security Cooperation“, "Defence Industry: Land, Naval, Air, Space, Police, Gendarmerie, Intelligence, Strategic Sectors."
It has been decided that the following findings and recommendations presented at the Forum should be brought to the attention of all relevant authorities and the public with a vision that will enhance existing achievements/institutions:
1. Concerns that comprehensive international military strategies in Africa are fueling regional security crises on the continent should be taken into account. There are strong views that Africa's inability to adequately strengthen its military capacity due to current problems in both the industry in general and the defence industry in particular paves the way for overly interventionist and neo-colonialist tendencies. It is also understood that the "terrorism" motif in Africa will continue to be used for a long time as a means of pressure through the systematic manipulation of competing states. "a tool of pressure through the systematic manipulation of competing states" for a long time to come.
2. Policies that prioritize "structural alignment" aimed at addressing development and security issues, which are also major causes of the migration problem, have been seen to have the opposite effect, fueling political and economic crises. Socioeconomic transformation is not independent of security, nor is it independent of science, technology, and innovation. Türkiye has significant potential for new strategic projects in the fields of defence, security, information technology, and space research that are compatible with the continent's 2063 vision for the future and contribute to mutual capacity development. Türkiye supports continental states facing various security threats such as terrorism, civil war, coups, cross-border crimes, and the negative effects of climate change in the areas of security and military.
3. To ensure peace and stability in Africa, Türkiye has participated in the "Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Missions" in Mali and the Central African Republic at the invitation of the UN. In addition to these missions, Turkish military personnel are also stationed at the military base in Somalia (TÜRKSOM), Türkiye's largest overseas facility. On the other hand, Türkiye has signed agreements in the military and defence fields with nearly half of the African states.
4. With the development of Turkish defence industry technology and its opening up to exports, African states facing various security issues have quickly become interested in Turkish defence industry products. So much so that exports have increased approximately fourfold within a year. From Africa, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Chad, Morocco, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Rwanda, and Uganda have imported various weapons, military vehicles, and equipment from Türkiye.
5. At this point, Türkiye has evolved from being a public diplomacy actor providing humanitarian aid to the continent to becoming an actor with high-level political influence in political and military matters. The rapid and decisive technological developments in the Turkish defence industry have also contributed significantly to this situation. The general security atmosphere on the continent and the political, military, and socio-economic structures of the countries provide suitable conditions for the export of Turkish defence industry products to the continent. However, on the other hand, Türkiye must closely and thoroughly monitor the continent's security issues for the future of its relations with Africa.
6. The Red Sea and the Horn of Africa have become not just a trade route, but a fragile security corridor where energy, security, and geopolitical competition are intertwined. This route, stretching from the Suez Canal to the Horn of Africa, is vital for the continuity of oil, natural gas, and global trade; however, it has become a high-risk security area due to regional conflicts, external interventions, and proxy wars.
7. Environmental vulnerabilities and ecological threats have become structural elements that deepen security problems in the Red Sea basin. The Red Sea, a shallow and ecologically sensitive sea, is vulnerable to environmental damage due to its coral reefs, undersea fault lines, and limited regeneration capacity. This situation has led to a deliberate avoidance policy in terms of energy pipelines and infrastructure projects.
8. The African region has become a permanent area of tension due to the conflicting strategic objectives of international and regional powers. Military interventions by the US, the UK, and the European Union, combined with the increasing military and commercial presence of China, Russia, Iran, and the Gulf countries, have had the effect of deepening competition rather than stabilizing security.
9. The Russia-Ukraine War and Gaza-centered conflicts have directly affected commercial and energy flows in the Red Sea, leading to changes in shipping routes. Petroleum tanker transits have decreased, shipments through the Suez Canal have fallen, and trade has shifted significantly to the Cape of Good Hope and alternative routes. This has extended delivery times, increased costs, and intensified global inflationary pressures.
10. Security risks are causing serious disruptions in global supply chains. Declarations of war zones and increases in insurance premiums are raising transportation costs, accelerating economic losses, particularly for food and perishable goods. The refusal of qualified crews to enter risky areas is creating a structural capacity problem in maritime transport.
11. Maritime transport has become vulnerable not only to military threats but also to the risks of accidents and infrastructure damage. Damage to submarine fiber optic cables has caused serious disruptions to internet and data traffic; electricity transmission projects and regional interconnection plans have been suspended due to conflicts. This situation highlights that security is not only a military issue but also an infrastructure issue.
12. Illegal trade is one of the most invisible yet widespread risks threatening security in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa. Drug, arms, human, organ, and wildlife trafficking are circulated globally through low inspection rates, structural loopholes in container shipping, and the manipulation of ship identification information.
13. The lack of oversight in the international maritime system increases the sustainability of illegal trade. The fact that only a very small portion of containers worldwide can be inspected, along with ship-to- ship transfers and multimodal transport networks, makes it difficult to detect illegal activities.
14. The Horn of Africa serves as a transit and buffer zone for illegal trade. Poverty, institutional weaknesses, and widespread corruption make the region attractive to global smuggling networks and deepen security problems.
15. Türkiye's growing military, commercial, and diplomatic presence in the region presents both opportunities and multidimensional risks. While Türkiye's military training base in Somalia, port operations, and defence industry exports increase its regional visibility, they also carry risks such as becoming an indirect party to conflicts, being negatively affected by illegal trade networks, and migration pressure.
16. Defence industry exports have become a strategic area that must be addressed in terms of ethics and security. The uncontrolled increase in arms sales carries the risk of fueling regional conflicts and deepening instability in the long term.
17. For Türkiye, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea represent a testing ground where a balance must be struck between global objectives and regional responsibilities. The balanced use of hard and soft power elements, along with infrastructure investments and security policies, must be addressed through a comprehensive strategy, which is of critical importance for regional stability.
18. The discourse of a multipolar world order has become a framework that redefines the competition for leadership among rising powers. China positions itself as the defender of multipolarity against the unipolar American order; however, within this understanding of multipolarity, it maintains the assumption that leadership still belongs to itself.
19. China's claim to leadership in the emerging world is historically rooted in the legacy of the Bandung Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement. Since the 1955 Bandung Conference, China has built legitimacy among developing countries through anti-colonial rhetoric, the principle of non- interference in internal affairs, and infrastructure aid.
20. The "Three Worlds Theory" has been the institutional expression of China's efforts to establish its leadership role among emerging countries on a theoretical basis. This approach, which defines the First World as imperial powers, the Second World as intermediate and the Third World as countries in need of development. This approach has served to position China as the natural representative of the Third World.
21. Today, China continues to offer its leadership to the rising world through the remnants of this historical discourse. Intensive diplomatic contacts established at the level of heads of state, symbolic gestures, and direct interaction between leaders enable China to make effective use of international meetings.
22. Multilateral platforms such as the G20 are not merely representative forums for emerging powers, but also arenas for building leadership. While actors such as China and South Africa strategically utilize these platforms, the distinction between symbolic presence and deep diplomatic engagement becomes increasingly apparent. Despite external pressures, South Africa has reinforced its position among emerging countries by demonstrating normative leadership in the G20 process. The publication of long and comprehensive declarations, the emphasis on multilateral will, and the adoption of an independent stance at a political cost have strengthened South Africa's claim to leadership.
23. Türkiye's position among emerging countries contains a gap between visible activities and perceived leadership. While infrastructure projects, military presence, and humanitarian initiatives are important, the response to these activities in the African public sphere remains limited.
24. For emerging powers, leadership is built not only through inter-state relations but also in the eyes of the public. Increasing democratic elections in Africa are creating a new political context where the perception of leadership is shaped by the people.
25. Cultural and educational visibility are the cornerstones of soft power. Countries that generate cultural influence through structures such as Confucius Institutes and the British Council are creating long- term spheres of influence. Türkiye's cultural and academic capacity is not sufficiently projected at the international level. Despite its universities, scholarship opportunities, and academic quality, Türkiye is not among the top choice countries for young people in Africa.
26. Education diplomacy is a low-cost but highly effective tool for influence. China's scholarships, particularly in business and technical fields, ensure lasting ties with Africa's future elites. The example of Qatar offers an alternative model of becoming a rising power through mediation and inclusive diplomacy. Foreign policy conducted by highly educated, young, and technocratic cadres generates global visibility through its role as a mediator bringing crisis actors together.
27. Institutional capacity is a decisive factor in the foreign policy effectiveness of rising powers. Young, specialized diplomatic staff directly linked to decision-making mechanisms enable rapid and effective foreign policy production. China and Qatar demonstrate that soft power and institutional renewal can be pursued simultaneously. Coordination between academia, diplomacy, and the state apparatus strengthens the claim to be a rising power.
28. Türkiye's risk-taking diplomatic initiatives are not sufficiently visible in the international public sphere. High-risk diplomatic moves, such as the launch of regular flights to Somalia and the Black Sea Grain Initiative, have not been sufficiently promoted and narrated on a global scale. Diplomacy conducted in high-risk areas does not generate perception unless it is supported by strategic communication. Actors in Africa benefit indirectly from Türkiye's contributions without being aware of them.
29. Diplomatic presence is not only gained by opening embassies, but also by being active and establishing cultural contacts in the field. Proactive diplomacy is strengthened by relationships established with local communities and cultural activities.
30. Cultural appeal is a key element of public diplomacy. Popular culture, historical narratives, and symbolic figures play a critical role in shaping international perceptions. Türkiye's historical experience and struggle for independence offer powerful narrative potential that can resonate with the emerging world. Atatürk's legacy of non-alignment and independent development needs to be reinterpreted through modern diplomatic discourse.
Devamı için...
The forum featured speakers and protocol participants from various countries and regions, representing different fields and sectors. Diplomatic representatives and delegations from different countries also attended. Presentations and speeches were delivered by local and foreign experts, academics, and diplomats at the Forum. Relevant authorities from Türkiye, Asia, Europe, America, and Africa were also represented at the Forum, and all sessions were followed institutionally.
The following important topics were discussed at the forum: " Africa 2063 Security, Defence and Space Vision: Partnership Perspectives", " African Union s Artificial Intelligence Strategy", "African Maritime Security and Türkiye," " Turkish Military Presence and New Horizons in Somalia, Djibouti, Libya, Sudan, Central African Republic, and Mali“, " 4th Türkiye - Africa Partnership Summit: Perspectives on Security Cooperation“, "Defence Industry: Land, Naval, Air, Space, Police, Gendarmerie, Intelligence, Strategic Sectors."
It has been decided that the following findings and recommendations presented at the Forum should be brought to the attention of all relevant authorities and the public with a vision that will enhance existing achievements/institutions:
1. Concerns that comprehensive international military strategies in Africa are fueling regional security crises on the continent should be taken into account. There are strong views that Africa's inability to adequately strengthen its military capacity due to current problems in both the industry in general and the defence industry in particular paves the way for overly interventionist and neo-colonialist tendencies. It is also understood that the "terrorism" motif in Africa will continue to be used for a long time as a means of pressure through the systematic manipulation of competing states. "a tool of pressure through the systematic manipulation of competing states" for a long time to come.
2. Policies that prioritize "structural alignment" aimed at addressing development and security issues, which are also major causes of the migration problem, have been seen to have the opposite effect, fueling political and economic crises. Socioeconomic transformation is not independent of security, nor is it independent of science, technology, and innovation. Türkiye has significant potential for new strategic projects in the fields of defence, security, information technology, and space research that are compatible with the continent's 2063 vision for the future and contribute to mutual capacity development. Türkiye supports continental states facing various security threats such as terrorism, civil war, coups, cross-border crimes, and the negative effects of climate change in the areas of security and military.
3. To ensure peace and stability in Africa, Türkiye has participated in the "Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Missions" in Mali and the Central African Republic at the invitation of the UN. In addition to these missions, Turkish military personnel are also stationed at the military base in Somalia (TÜRKSOM), Türkiye's largest overseas facility. On the other hand, Türkiye has signed agreements in the military and defence fields with nearly half of the African states.
4. With the development of Turkish defence industry technology and its opening up to exports, African states facing various security issues have quickly become interested in Turkish defence industry products. So much so that exports have increased approximately fourfold within a year. From Africa, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Chad, Morocco, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Rwanda, and Uganda have imported various weapons, military vehicles, and equipment from Türkiye.
5. At this point, Türkiye has evolved from being a public diplomacy actor providing humanitarian aid to the continent to becoming an actor with high-level political influence in political and military matters. The rapid and decisive technological developments in the Turkish defence industry have also contributed significantly to this situation. The general security atmosphere on the continent and the political, military, and socio-economic structures of the countries provide suitable conditions for the export of Turkish defence industry products to the continent. However, on the other hand, Türkiye must closely and thoroughly monitor the continent's security issues for the future of its relations with Africa.
6. The Red Sea and the Horn of Africa have become not just a trade route, but a fragile security corridor where energy, security, and geopolitical competition are intertwined. This route, stretching from the Suez Canal to the Horn of Africa, is vital for the continuity of oil, natural gas, and global trade; however, it has become a high-risk security area due to regional conflicts, external interventions, and proxy wars.
7. Environmental vulnerabilities and ecological threats have become structural elements that deepen security problems in the Red Sea basin. The Red Sea, a shallow and ecologically sensitive sea, is vulnerable to environmental damage due to its coral reefs, undersea fault lines, and limited regeneration capacity. This situation has led to a deliberate avoidance policy in terms of energy pipelines and infrastructure projects.
8. The African region has become a permanent area of tension due to the conflicting strategic objectives of international and regional powers. Military interventions by the US, the UK, and the European Union, combined with the increasing military and commercial presence of China, Russia, Iran, and the Gulf countries, have had the effect of deepening competition rather than stabilizing security.
9. The Russia-Ukraine War and Gaza-centered conflicts have directly affected commercial and energy flows in the Red Sea, leading to changes in shipping routes. Petroleum tanker transits have decreased, shipments through the Suez Canal have fallen, and trade has shifted significantly to the Cape of Good Hope and alternative routes. This has extended delivery times, increased costs, and intensified global inflationary pressures.
10. Security risks are causing serious disruptions in global supply chains. Declarations of war zones and increases in insurance premiums are raising transportation costs, accelerating economic losses, particularly for food and perishable goods. The refusal of qualified crews to enter risky areas is creating a structural capacity problem in maritime transport.
11. Maritime transport has become vulnerable not only to military threats but also to the risks of accidents and infrastructure damage. Damage to submarine fiber optic cables has caused serious disruptions to internet and data traffic; electricity transmission projects and regional interconnection plans have been suspended due to conflicts. This situation highlights that security is not only a military issue but also an infrastructure issue.
12. Illegal trade is one of the most invisible yet widespread risks threatening security in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa. Drug, arms, human, organ, and wildlife trafficking are circulated globally through low inspection rates, structural loopholes in container shipping, and the manipulation of ship identification information.
13. The lack of oversight in the international maritime system increases the sustainability of illegal trade. The fact that only a very small portion of containers worldwide can be inspected, along with ship-to- ship transfers and multimodal transport networks, makes it difficult to detect illegal activities.
14. The Horn of Africa serves as a transit and buffer zone for illegal trade. Poverty, institutional weaknesses, and widespread corruption make the region attractive to global smuggling networks and deepen security problems.
15. Türkiye's growing military, commercial, and diplomatic presence in the region presents both opportunities and multidimensional risks. While Türkiye's military training base in Somalia, port operations, and defence industry exports increase its regional visibility, they also carry risks such as becoming an indirect party to conflicts, being negatively affected by illegal trade networks, and migration pressure.
16. Defence industry exports have become a strategic area that must be addressed in terms of ethics and security. The uncontrolled increase in arms sales carries the risk of fueling regional conflicts and deepening instability in the long term.
17. For Türkiye, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea represent a testing ground where a balance must be struck between global objectives and regional responsibilities. The balanced use of hard and soft power elements, along with infrastructure investments and security policies, must be addressed through a comprehensive strategy, which is of critical importance for regional stability.
18. The discourse of a multipolar world order has become a framework that redefines the competition for leadership among rising powers. China positions itself as the defender of multipolarity against the unipolar American order; however, within this understanding of multipolarity, it maintains the assumption that leadership still belongs to itself.
19. China's claim to leadership in the emerging world is historically rooted in the legacy of the Bandung Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement. Since the 1955 Bandung Conference, China has built legitimacy among developing countries through anti-colonial rhetoric, the principle of non- interference in internal affairs, and infrastructure aid.
20. The "Three Worlds Theory" has been the institutional expression of China's efforts to establish its leadership role among emerging countries on a theoretical basis. This approach, which defines the First World as imperial powers, the Second World as intermediate and the Third World as countries in need of development. This approach has served to position China as the natural representative of the Third World.
21. Today, China continues to offer its leadership to the rising world through the remnants of this historical discourse. Intensive diplomatic contacts established at the level of heads of state, symbolic gestures, and direct interaction between leaders enable China to make effective use of international meetings.
22. Multilateral platforms such as the G20 are not merely representative forums for emerging powers, but also arenas for building leadership. While actors such as China and South Africa strategically utilize these platforms, the distinction between symbolic presence and deep diplomatic engagement becomes increasingly apparent. Despite external pressures, South Africa has reinforced its position among emerging countries by demonstrating normative leadership in the G20 process. The publication of long and comprehensive declarations, the emphasis on multilateral will, and the adoption of an independent stance at a political cost have strengthened South Africa's claim to leadership.
23. Türkiye's position among emerging countries contains a gap between visible activities and perceived leadership. While infrastructure projects, military presence, and humanitarian initiatives are important, the response to these activities in the African public sphere remains limited.
24. For emerging powers, leadership is built not only through inter-state relations but also in the eyes of the public. Increasing democratic elections in Africa are creating a new political context where the perception of leadership is shaped by the people.
25. Cultural and educational visibility are the cornerstones of soft power. Countries that generate cultural influence through structures such as Confucius Institutes and the British Council are creating long- term spheres of influence. Türkiye's cultural and academic capacity is not sufficiently projected at the international level. Despite its universities, scholarship opportunities, and academic quality, Türkiye is not among the top choice countries for young people in Africa.
26. Education diplomacy is a low-cost but highly effective tool for influence. China's scholarships, particularly in business and technical fields, ensure lasting ties with Africa's future elites. The example of Qatar offers an alternative model of becoming a rising power through mediation and inclusive diplomacy. Foreign policy conducted by highly educated, young, and technocratic cadres generates global visibility through its role as a mediator bringing crisis actors together.
27. Institutional capacity is a decisive factor in the foreign policy effectiveness of rising powers. Young, specialized diplomatic staff directly linked to decision-making mechanisms enable rapid and effective foreign policy production. China and Qatar demonstrate that soft power and institutional renewal can be pursued simultaneously. Coordination between academia, diplomacy, and the state apparatus strengthens the claim to be a rising power.
28. Türkiye's risk-taking diplomatic initiatives are not sufficiently visible in the international public sphere. High-risk diplomatic moves, such as the launch of regular flights to Somalia and the Black Sea Grain Initiative, have not been sufficiently promoted and narrated on a global scale. Diplomacy conducted in high-risk areas does not generate perception unless it is supported by strategic communication. Actors in Africa benefit indirectly from Türkiye's contributions without being aware of them.
29. Diplomatic presence is not only gained by opening embassies, but also by being active and establishing cultural contacts in the field. Proactive diplomacy is strengthened by relationships established with local communities and cultural activities.
30. Cultural appeal is a key element of public diplomacy. Popular culture, historical narratives, and symbolic figures play a critical role in shaping international perceptions. Türkiye's historical experience and struggle for independence offer powerful narrative potential that can resonate with the emerging world. Atatürk's legacy of non-alignment and independent development needs to be reinterpreted through modern diplomatic discourse.
Devamı için...
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