Why Deepening Ties with Reliable NATO Allies Is Preferable to Concessions Under EU’s SAFE Initiative
Introduction
The EU’s SAFE (Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform)¹ initiative promises substantial funding for strengthening Europe’s defence industrial base. However, participation in SAFE cannot come at the expense of Türkiye’s strategic interests, especially given politicization attempts by Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA; i.e. Southern part of the island of Cyprus). This is exactly why deepening cooperation on the sphere of military-industry with NATO allies such as Spain, Italy, Portugal, Poland, Hungary, and Romania, is becoming all the more crucial.
1. NATO as the Foundation of European Security: No Duplication, No Divisions
Türkiye supports the principle that European defence initiatives must be “separable but not separate“ from NATO. Because Türkiye is not an EU member and lacks voting rights in SAFE’s governance, its participation would risk exposure to Greek/GCA manipulation. Rather than giving compromises to Greek and Greek Cypriot demands on joining SAFE initiative of the European Union (EU), under the conditions that are desired by the EU commission and the Greek and Greek Cypriot governments, Türkiye has better options to develop bilateral ties with reliable NATO and EU member States. While SAFE is a wonderful new funding tool for making the European Security Architecture, Türkiye's position must be that the European Defense initiatives should be within NATO and not aim at duplicating the existing NATO mechanisms.
2. Politicization by Greece and the GCA
Analyses published by Greek institutions such as ELIAMEP² frame SAFE as a tool to condition Türkiye’s strategic choices. The tone actually smartly portraying how Ankara would “leverages NATO membership and geographic centrality to project influence, while aspiring to join the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) initiative.“ This reflects a structural pattern whereby Greece and the GCA block Türkiye’s access to EU defence formats by tying unrelated bilateral disputes to broader mechanisms. While there is obviously a desire by the Turkish Military-Industrial companies to have more access to foreign funding, including EU funds, this doesn’t mean that Türkiye should necessarily aspire to join SAFE. Türkiye’s strategic objective is not necessarily to join SAFE itself but to join the EU as a full-fledged member, and with guarantees of membership not being vetoed by Greece or Cyprus-Greek Cypriot Administration.
The EU’s SAFE (Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform)¹ initiative promises substantial funding for strengthening Europe’s defence industrial base. However, participation in SAFE cannot come at the expense of Türkiye’s strategic interests, especially given politicization attempts by Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA; i.e. Southern part of the island of Cyprus). This is exactly why deepening cooperation on the sphere of military-industry with NATO allies such as Spain, Italy, Portugal, Poland, Hungary, and Romania, is becoming all the more crucial.
1. NATO as the Foundation of European Security: No Duplication, No Divisions
Türkiye supports the principle that European defence initiatives must be “separable but not separate“ from NATO. Because Türkiye is not an EU member and lacks voting rights in SAFE’s governance, its participation would risk exposure to Greek/GCA manipulation. Rather than giving compromises to Greek and Greek Cypriot demands on joining SAFE initiative of the European Union (EU), under the conditions that are desired by the EU commission and the Greek and Greek Cypriot governments, Türkiye has better options to develop bilateral ties with reliable NATO and EU member States. While SAFE is a wonderful new funding tool for making the European Security Architecture, Türkiye's position must be that the European Defense initiatives should be within NATO and not aim at duplicating the existing NATO mechanisms.
2. Politicization by Greece and the GCA
Analyses published by Greek institutions such as ELIAMEP² frame SAFE as a tool to condition Türkiye’s strategic choices. The tone actually smartly portraying how Ankara would “leverages NATO membership and geographic centrality to project influence, while aspiring to join the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) initiative.“ This reflects a structural pattern whereby Greece and the GCA block Türkiye’s access to EU defence formats by tying unrelated bilateral disputes to broader mechanisms. While there is obviously a desire by the Turkish Military-Industrial companies to have more access to foreign funding, including EU funds, this doesn’t mean that Türkiye should necessarily aspire to join SAFE. Türkiye’s strategic objective is not necessarily to join SAFE itself but to join the EU as a full-fledged member, and with guarantees of membership not being vetoed by Greece or Cyprus-Greek Cypriot Administration.