India Between QUAD and BRICS: Strategic Balance in a Multipolar World

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Nowhere is this more visible than in India’s active engagement with two seemingly divergent platforms: the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and BRICS. While QUAD — comprising the United States, Japan, Australia, and India — is viewed as a response to China’s assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific, BRICS — a grouping of now 10 countries with Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa as the original acronym, which now also includes Indonesia, Ethiopia, Iran, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates (UAE)....

India Between QUAD and BRICS: Strategic Balance in a Multipolar World

In today’s increasingly multipolar global order, where blocs (mostly Western and non-Western) and ideological alignments are surfacing under new names, India stands out for its deliberate pursuit of a multi-aligned foreign policy. Nowhere is this more visible than in India’s active engagement with two seemingly divergent platforms: the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and BRICS. While QUAD — comprising the United States, Japan, Australia, and India — is viewed as a response to China’s assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific, BRICS — a grouping of now 10 countries with Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa as the original acronym, which now also includes Indonesia, Ethiopia, Iran, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Note: The uncertain status of Saudi Arabia is the reason why the group is called a group of 10)— symbolizes the aspirations of the Global South to reshape global governance. India’s choice to participate vigorously in both reflects a strategic autonomy.

BRICS and India: Voice of the Global South

India has been a pillar of BRICS since its inception as "BRIC" in the mid-2000s. As the world’s most populous country and a rapidly growing to likely become the 4th largest economy economy by end of 2025 (https://www.cnbc.com/2025/05/29/cnbc-inside-india-newsletter-india-set-to-be-the-worlds-fourth-largest-economy.html), India uses BRICS to amplify the voice of the developing world, particularly on issues such as climate change financing, technology transfer, and institutional reform.

The creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) has allowed BRICS countries to offer alternatives to the Western-dominated IMF and World Bank (even though the NDB is relatively small compared to the IMF and World Bank). Through these initiatives, India promotes financial multipolarity and less dependence on Bretton Woods institutions. The BRICS grouping has also become an avenue for India to remain diplomatically engaged with both Russia and China despite growing geopolitical differences.

While India has occasionally voiced frustration with China's dominance within BRICS, it views the forum as a strategic platform for non-Western multilateralism, and for projecting influence in Africa, Latin America, and other parts of the Global South. However, India, Brazil and South Africa, do not necessarily view the BRICS group as an anti-Western platform. Which is specifically why another platform, QUAD, is allowing India to engage with Western powers and thus provide a strategic counter-weight in Asia as well as the broader Indo-Pacific.

QUAD and the Indo-Pacific

India’s commitment to the QUAD, is significant. The dialogue’s agenda includes critical areas such as cybersecurity, infrastructure, counterterrorism, supply chain security, maritime cooperation and domain awareness. QUAD is not an alliance, it is a flexible strategic platform. QUAD is a dialogue mechanism, that enhances India’s profile as a key Indo-Pacific actor.

Growing Chinese influence and presence, especially in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Himalayas, has pushed India to seek deeper collaboration with other Indo-Pacific democracies. As observed by a July 2025 article published in The Diplomat (https://thediplomat.com/2025/07/india-the-quad-and-chinas-shadow-building-a-coherent-indo-pacific-strategy/), India is actively working to build a coherent Indo-Pacific strategy through QUAD.

Indian policymakers have also emphasized QUAD's positive agenda — from the Critical Minerals Initiative (Japan Times https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/07/02/japan/politics/quad-nations-critical-minerals-initiative/) to joint humanitarian missions. Moreover, QUAD foreign ministers recently expressed concern over the East and South China Sea situation (Business Standard https://www.business-standard.com/world-news/quad-foreign-ministers-concerned-about-east-and-south-china-sea-situation-125070200130_1.html). Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar reinforced India’s commitment to a "free and open Indo-Pacific" in a bilateral with his Japanese counterpart (Mid-Day https://www.mid-day.com/news/world-news/article/quad-engagement-for-free-open-indo-pacific-jaishankar-and-japans-foreign-minister-exchange-views-23582732).

Finally, India’s assertive voice on counterterrorism within QUAD, as discussed in CNKY article (https://cnky.in/the-quad-terrorism-and-indias-assertive-role/), shows how the country is expanding the platform’s focus beyond maritime security into hard security and intelligence domains.

Why Both BRICS and QUAD? India’s Calculated Multi-Alignment

India’s dual engagement in QUAD and BRICS reflects a conscious departure from Cold War-era binaries. This pragmatic multi-alignment serves several national objectives of strategic hedging between the West and the Global South, which would allow issue based diplomacy and reinforce India’s policy of strategic autonomy. India’s aim for strategic autonomy is necessary for its aspirations for regional and global leadership.

Strategic Hedging: In a turbulent international environment, India hedges against the risks of overdependence on any one bloc. While QUAD offers deterrence and infrastructure support, BRICS supports India’s ambition to lead reform in global governance.

Issue-Based Diplomacy: India partners with different countries on different issues. With the U.S. and Japan on tech and defense, with Russia on energy and security, and with China on climate and BRICS banking.

Strategic Autonomy: India has never accepted the label of a formal U.S. ally. It prefers sovereignty-first diplomacy, evident in its continued oil imports from Russia, participation in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and defense diversification.

Aspirations for Global Leadership: India wants to lead not only in South Asia, but also in the broader Indo-Pacific and Global South. QUAD and BRICS offer complementary platforms to pursue these ambitions.
 
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