BRICS: A Crossroads for an Uninstitutionalized Southern Platform?
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) emerged as a significant platform with the ambition of becoming the voice of rising powers in the global system, aiming in particular to highlight the demands of the Global South. However, it is evident that BRICS is still not a fully institutionalized international organization. It lacks a fixed headquarters, a permanent secretary-general, a binding founding charter, or clearly defined decision-making mechanisms. In this sense, BRICS remains a flexible consultative platform shaped primarily around annual summits and thematic cooperation.
In this context, the BRICS Summit to be held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in July 2025 may prove to be a critical turning point. Although it is noteworthy that Türkiye will participate as an invited guest, it is expected that the internal disagreements within BRICS will become even more visible during this meeting.
While BRICS originally set out with the goal of economic cooperation, in recent years it has begun to include political issues such as security, counterterrorism, and global governance on its agenda. However, the divergences in these areas indicate serious divisions. There are deep differences between India’s position on counterterrorism and the approaches of Iran or China. Disagreements also arise over other regional issues. For instance, following the war in Ukraine, Russia’s stance toward the West does not align with the more cautious positions of Brazil or South Africa.
Brazil, India, and South Africa, which stand out for their democratic structures, share a common approach that BRICS should not evolve into an anti-Western alliance. For these countries, BRICS’s primary aim is to promote fairer representation in global governance and to develop alternative economic frameworks. In contrast, countries like China, Russia, and Iran exhibit tendencies to transform BRICS into a strategic front against the West, which creates fissures within the platform’s internal dynamics. Even on the matter of “de-dollarization“—reducing the U.S. dollar’s role in global trade—there is no consensus among member states.
Conclusion and Expectations from the July 2025 Summit
The Rio Summit in July 2025 represents an important test for the future of BRICS. Developments such as Saudi Arabia’s decision to officially refrain from joining and the potential accession of Indonesia have prompted a reassessment of the platform’s expansion policy.
The following topics are expected to be prominent at the summit:
· Clarification of new membership criteria
· Reform and effectiveness of the BRICS New Development Bank
· Initiatives for a common digital payment system and currency
· Development challenges in the Global South (food, energy, health, debt crises)
· Limits and divergences in security cooperation
This summit, which Türkiye will attend as an invited guest, may also create opportunities for Ankara to pursue new economic openings with the Global South. However, it should be borne in mind that BRICS is not a formal organization and remains an uninstitutionalized platform. Therefore, rather than setting excessive political expectations, efforts should focus on cooperation in thematic and economic fields. In this regard, enhancing collaboration with the New Development Bank—which is an institutional structure—is particularly important.
References
1. BRICS Official Website: https://brics2025.gov.br/en/
2. Foreign Policy (2025). "India, Brazil, and South Africa Are Not on the Same Page as China and Russia". https://foreignpolicy.com/...
3. The New Indian Express (2025). "Unity Against Terror: BRICS Parliamentarians Back India’s Stance". https://www.newindianexpress.com/...
4. PIB India (2025). "India to Chair BRICS Forum in 2026". https://www.pib.gov.in/...
5. Asia News Network (2025). "IBSA and BRICS in a Changing World". https://asianews.network/...
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) emerged as a significant platform with the ambition of becoming the voice of rising powers in the global system, aiming in particular to highlight the demands of the Global South. However, it is evident that BRICS is still not a fully institutionalized international organization. It lacks a fixed headquarters, a permanent secretary-general, a binding founding charter, or clearly defined decision-making mechanisms. In this sense, BRICS remains a flexible consultative platform shaped primarily around annual summits and thematic cooperation.
In this context, the BRICS Summit to be held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in July 2025 may prove to be a critical turning point. Although it is noteworthy that Türkiye will participate as an invited guest, it is expected that the internal disagreements within BRICS will become even more visible during this meeting.
While BRICS originally set out with the goal of economic cooperation, in recent years it has begun to include political issues such as security, counterterrorism, and global governance on its agenda. However, the divergences in these areas indicate serious divisions. There are deep differences between India’s position on counterterrorism and the approaches of Iran or China. Disagreements also arise over other regional issues. For instance, following the war in Ukraine, Russia’s stance toward the West does not align with the more cautious positions of Brazil or South Africa.
Brazil, India, and South Africa, which stand out for their democratic structures, share a common approach that BRICS should not evolve into an anti-Western alliance. For these countries, BRICS’s primary aim is to promote fairer representation in global governance and to develop alternative economic frameworks. In contrast, countries like China, Russia, and Iran exhibit tendencies to transform BRICS into a strategic front against the West, which creates fissures within the platform’s internal dynamics. Even on the matter of “de-dollarization“—reducing the U.S. dollar’s role in global trade—there is no consensus among member states.
Conclusion and Expectations from the July 2025 Summit
The Rio Summit in July 2025 represents an important test for the future of BRICS. Developments such as Saudi Arabia’s decision to officially refrain from joining and the potential accession of Indonesia have prompted a reassessment of the platform’s expansion policy.
The following topics are expected to be prominent at the summit:
· Clarification of new membership criteria
· Reform and effectiveness of the BRICS New Development Bank
· Initiatives for a common digital payment system and currency
· Development challenges in the Global South (food, energy, health, debt crises)
· Limits and divergences in security cooperation
This summit, which Türkiye will attend as an invited guest, may also create opportunities for Ankara to pursue new economic openings with the Global South. However, it should be borne in mind that BRICS is not a formal organization and remains an uninstitutionalized platform. Therefore, rather than setting excessive political expectations, efforts should focus on cooperation in thematic and economic fields. In this regard, enhancing collaboration with the New Development Bank—which is an institutional structure—is particularly important.
References
1. BRICS Official Website: https://brics2025.gov.br/en/
2. Foreign Policy (2025). "India, Brazil, and South Africa Are Not on the Same Page as China and Russia". https://foreignpolicy.com/...
3. The New Indian Express (2025). "Unity Against Terror: BRICS Parliamentarians Back India’s Stance". https://www.newindianexpress.com/...
4. PIB India (2025). "India to Chair BRICS Forum in 2026". https://www.pib.gov.in/...
5. Asia News Network (2025). "IBSA and BRICS in a Changing World". https://asianews.network/...
_jpeg_2025_22_12_b3702079-4965-4132-8c28-6f30c62c1513.jpeg "Defense, Security, and Intelligence Revolution: Technopolitics and Demopolitics")
