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VISION DOCUMENT (DRAFT)

7TH ISTANBUL SECURITY CONFERENCE (2021)

“Post-Security Geopolitics: China, Russia, India, Japan and NATO”

(04-05 November 2021, DoubleTree by Hilton Istanbul Atasehir Hotel & Conference Centre)

The world has witnessed unprecedented polarisation and disintegration acts driven by the most recent wave of globalization emerged in the 1980s. This is most noticeable, in the "core countries" or the “center of capitalism” in particular, between globally operating capital circles and national capital circles, which are striving to maintain their interests and their strengths. Although the interests of global capital circles and national capital circles partially overlap, they are mostly in conflict with each other. The experience of the USA under the Trump administration is a striking example of this type of developments. Such tendencies or developments are also likely to emerge in certain countries such as China, India, dominant members of the EU, Russia, Japan and Brazil. This means that there is a significant shift in traditional nation-state model, in which the capital circles defined themselves with their own countries. This change made it imperative to review the definition or concept of the security and interests of the traditional sovereign nation-state model. This growing sophistication in security perspectives is defined by the concept of "post-security".

This change in the perspective of the interests and security of the traditional territorial "nation-state" indicates that the traditional geopolitical mindset, which seeks to maximize the interests of the state depending on the maximizing the interests of the territorial "nation-state", is also in a process of change. As such, the framework of the new geopolitical mindset will be determined by competition, conflict or cooperation efforts, which can be experienced between the national capital circles that advocate the strengthening of the national framework and the global capital circles that considers the national framework as a serious constraint for its operational objectives and embraces the entire world as its “homeland” over the coming decades. Moreover, the potential for competition, conflict and cooperation, at the same time, within national capital circles as well as global capital circles themselves makes the issue much more complicated.

This situation signifies more sophisticated and unpredictable circumstances, compared to the previous periods and in terms of the geopolitical agendas, as well as the political projections of certain dominant actors over the decades to come. There has been concerns in this context about that the classical





modernist political behavior patterns are likely to pose threats to the sustainability of a prospective world landscape in which traditional security policies with classical methods are no longer sustainable. New geopolitical trends, therefore, which emerge within the context of these concerns, are defined as the "post-security geopolitics".

Moreover, the changes identified by recent analyses such as "critical geopolitics", which are of great importance for the decades to come, deepens further the geopolitical sophistication in question. These dynamics have a potential not only to initiate competition and conflict, but also cooperation. It is highly likely, for example, that there will be significant changes, over the coming decades, in traditional energy geopolitics due to the increase in the share of elements within the energy sector, such as renewable energy, shale gas, shale oil and fusion-based nuclear technology. Certain specific factors, such as environmental pollution, global warming, health crises like COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the current economic interdependence have been increasingly limiting the effectiveness of the decision-making processes and the implementation capabilities of individual countries. No single country therefore can address these challenges alone. Furthermore, even strong economies cannot face such challenges all by themselves through their national instruments or even by regional cooperation policies or efforts. In other words, if countries and regional organizations are to survive, they must do so in the context of a well-functioning global system. These new global challenges give the nations no choice, even the "rising powers" such as China and India that have adversarial relations with certain countries, but to cooperate for mutual global solutions –regardless of the degree of their adversarial stance.

This evolving geopolitical environment, which is defined as "geopolitical renewal and change", includes a number of elements such as the current and future validity of the classical geopolitical theories; a shift from the "shatter belt" concept to the "gateway region" concept (more specifically, in the contexts of China's Belt and Road Initiative and the "artificial islands" built by China in the South China Sea); power focus theory or geopolitics; "transhumanistic" geopolitics and autonomous military systems.

"Transhumanistic geopolitics" argues that "non-human actors", such as autonomous systems, machine learning algorithms, malicious software, have an equally central role to play, as well as "humans", in crisis and armed conflicts, because human and non-human actors as equal elements in transforming the space or the environment. The instruments of power or domination are no longer just humans or legal entities, but the objects of techno-political actors and their synergistic combinations. From the "transhumanistic" geopolitical point of view, space or environment is no longer dominated by humans, on the contrary, autonomous systems can constantly or increasingly create unexpected or unimaginable spaces or environments. Autonomous systems therefore are not passive instruments, but "ontological actors" that have the potential to re-program the environments in which people coexist.





Other characteristics of this dynamic process also include a variety of specific elements such as the "theory of space domination" or "universal geopolitics", geopolitical impact of global companies, the increase in "state-terrorism" and "assassinations by states" as well as trends to shift to "empire-states" or "city-states".

The "The Great Reset" concept, which is offered by the World Economic Forum (WEF) as the main theme of Davos Summit 2021, suggests or recommends a fundamental paradigm shift for a better or a sustainable global economy, which specifies redesigning of capitalism and re-definition of the money, in particular, as a means of exchange. In this context, however, there remain questions unanswered about what the concept of "sharing-capitalism" means, and its potential consequences, repercussions or impacts on global security", whether this is a possible return to the Bretton Woods system.

The current characteristics of global environment defined by the concept of "post-security" give countries no choice but to review their traditional security perspectives and realist "power-politics" as well as their traditional "power-balance" efforts. Problem solving efforts through traditional real-politics-based conflict methods driven by the competitive interventionist policies and alliance pacts between rivals has been gradually decreasing, particularly given the range of global challenges in an increasingly globalizing world. Yet, the possibility of returning, through various ways and means of conflicts, to the traditional balance of power approach, to a moment that characterized by fierce competition, tensions and conflicts, still continues today the extent to which even the EU member countries are facing the social and political crises due to the rise of the far-right movements. In fact, the "wounds" of the conflicts took place in the Balkans during the 1990s have not been healed yet. Given the extremely self-centered practices or attitudes as well as a lack of solidarity between the EU countries during the COVID-19 crisis, it is clear that the traditional nation-state sovereignty approaches continue.

Recent years have witnessed a growing intra-Alliance political discussion about NATO's profile, which perfectly exemplifies or illustrates the aforementioned issues. The NATO Alliance was the backbone of the security of the Western-Alliance during the Cold War. Today, however, it has been described as "a burden on the US nation" by the US government, which is the most important member of NATO, and as "an Alliance with brain death" by France, which is also one of the most important allies. It is inevitable, in this context, that the other allies have deep concerns about the future of the NATO Alliance that is of concern to global powers such as China, India and Russia as well.

The NATO 2030 Initiative, which is the substantial reform plan or the "reconstruction" draft plan, includes certain principles such as limiting the right to veto or making its procedures more difficult, getting together more frequently, making decisions more quickly, as well as rapid intervention in crises, the participation of the EU member countries that are not members of NATO in Alliance meetings, and more focus on threats posed by China. Some have questioned, in the context of NATO's expenditures, whether 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) can be allocated to the defense sector by 2024 (as a share





of total government expenditure and 20% of it for basic defense equipment only). The other issues around which questions arise within NATO are the expected increase in out of area use, the expansion process of NATO and its scope, as well as the questions about whether the US will leverage it to yield an operational advantage in seeking to become a hegemonic power again. The process of redefinition of NATO's new strategy concept requires redefinition of its primary tasks or operational framework, which needs to encompass a variety of issues, including Russia and China, as well as weapons of mass destruction and global terrorism. It must be taken into account that identifying both China and Russia as threats to NATO or as its operational targets at the same time may result in a strategic partnership between these two countries.

In an effort to increase its defense cooperation (while there is no plan to create an EU army; or if it is not a step closer to creating an EU army), the EU called for certain members to contribute to its collective defense, within the scope of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) agreement signed by 23 EU members in 2017. The EU, in return, has committed to supporting PESCO with a budget of 5 billion euros since 2020. Although PESCO, which is a "supra-governmental" cooperation mechanism, has far less chance, in terms of its objectives, of success than NATO, which is an "inter-governmental" cooperation platform, the European Union appears quite determined in its efforts for this end.

Practices and discourses based on the traditional security perspectives, and the concepts of inequality and injustice defined depending on these security approaches, as well as identity politics with blatant discrimination mechanisms used when identifying the "self" and the "other" reproduces the elements of violence, insecurity and risks. For the "post-security" approach, traditional security discourse turns into a self-sustaining mechanism that promises impossible goals.

From an economic point of view, the economic downturn, not only due to the COVID-19 lockdown, but also the lasting effects of the global financial crisis that broke out in 2008, has exposed the crises such as cultural divisions, identity politics or polarisation arising from the inability to institutionalize the governance processes, even in large projects such as the EU with a very strong basis for cooperation. Certain problems such as the inability to repay public debts and foreign debts of the states are forced countries to readjust themselves to the "post-security" environment.

The concept of "Power and Capital" is rapidly changing, as has been repeatedly emphasized for many years. The pace of change of almost everything conventional, including large armies, large populations, large public service staff and expert groups, defense industry capacities or the organization that support them, as well as producers, has increased due to the COVID-19 pandemic. It is clear that there should be a regularly updated research for what the new convention is, at a moment when knowledge or information possesses a value by itself alone and even surpasses the existing currencies. In this context, the world is on the threshold of a new area in which the conventional market accumulation is rapidly





losing its value. It will be decisive, in terms of the new "distribution of power" and "geopolitics", to consider what the economic environment of the new convention will be, and how it should transform itself.

It has been re-affirmed, as a result of the pandemic, that certain key sectors or concepts such as "autonomy", "biotechnology", "artificial intelligence", "nanotechnology", "space" and "strategic services or logistics" will transform the global business models, the distribution of "power and capital", and "post-security geopolitics". This situation makes it necessary for organizations and their shareholders operating in defense, security, diplomacy, society and economy areas to review these new conventional concepts and re-organize. The main parameter of these re-organization efforts is to acknowledge that "security" in itself is "everything", but also "nothing". In this context, it is the most important situational awareness to see that the adversary or friendly actor is the power or strength of the institutional infrastructure "itself" and the pace of developing a regulation shift.

It is clear that traditional geopolitical approaches have started to lose their functionality in this environment. The efforts of China and India, for example, which seek to dominate "at any cost" certain locations having strategic importance for their geopolitical objectives, such as Kashmir and Tibet, which have been scene of repeated conflicts for this end, would end in failure not only in achieving their goal of preserving and developing their current position in the new global economic environment, but also increasing emergencies such as environmental pollution and global warming, except that they review their approach.

The Belt and Road Initiative of China is therefore unlikely to be realized completely or as planned, as considerable disagreement or conflict of interests, in the context of China-India relations, remains unresolved. It is also unlikely that India will have the capability to plan a stable future without reviewing its current security framework of geopolitics, society and economics. These challenges are not only one of the areas of immediate interest of China and India, but also will gradually be a source of concern for all countries, regardless of their scale, as well as other international actors over the coming decades. Increasing interdependence and interaction driven by the increased globalization, which is accepted as inevitable, gives countries no choice but to review their traditional perspective of nation-state sovereignty and zero-sum national security, and to adapt themselves to these evolving circumstances. Countries cannot tend to be unaware of, or indifferent to any developments in this dynamic global process, including the realms of politics, economics, society or culture, as even the smallest development in any area of life across the world has the potential to affect each of them as well.





Considering the role of the "post-security" approach in this context, certain actors with highly developed strategic planning capabilities can manipulate or exploit the new potentials or new developments for their own interests by leveraging sophisticated ways and means. Medium and small-scale countries, in particular, need to observe these sophisticated processes more cautiously and gain the ability to take measures quickly and of adaptation in order to survive.

The Covid-19 case shows that all accepted geopolitical standards, norms or perspectives, such as economic sustainability and various security investments, have become pointless. The gravity and duration of this downturn will be determined by alliances, integrations or differences between national and global capacities, rather than by integrations or competitions between countries over the decades to come. It is necessary, in this context, to work on unusual formulas to define the new geopolitics. The future of international order and multi-national organizations, which will be shaped within the context of "micro-nationalism", "integration" and "unpredictability", depends on a world vision driven by "Power and Justice". A post-security and an unconventional geopolitics is shaping itself, in which global and national capacities are converging and overlapping or diverging and conflicting. In this new "reality", the fundamental question will be how the future of China, Russia, India, Japan and NATO will shape their competition with each other.

During this period, which is defined as a "post-security" era, not only strong economies such as the US, UK, dominant members of the EU, Russia and Japan, but also the situations or profiles of certain countries like China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Turkey, which are defined as "rising powers", should be under close follow-up with new ways and means. The event, under the main theme **"Post-Security Geopolitics: China, Russia, India, Japan and NATO"**, is of great importance in terms of offering policy options for decision makers, but also guiding or leading to academic studies on this issue.

Main Theme

Post-Security Geopolitics: China, Russia, India, Japan and NATO

Sub-Themes

Post-Security: Conceptual Analysis

Geopolitical Renewal and Change | Geopolitical Trends in the Post-Security Period

Post-Human Geopolitics, Universal Geopolitics (Space Domination)





Ocean Geopolitics, Global Corporate Geopolitics

Blocking and Disintegration Tendencies in the Post-Security Period

Restructuring and 2030 Perspective of NATO

The Future of Alliances in the Post-Security Era: NATO - PESCO

Asian NATO QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: USA, Japan, Australia, India) and Indo-Pacific

Current Vision of PESCO and Determination of EU

The Great Reset

Geopolitical Data Challenges

Strengthening Government and Demand for Effective Governance

The Fragility Phenomenon and Geopolitics of Global-Regional Struggle

Country / Territory Orientations - Perspectives

USA

EU Countries and Europe | England | Russia

China | Japan | India

Latin America | Brazil

Africa | Republic of South Africa | Egypt | Nigeria

Turkey

Indonesia | Vietnam | Iran | Pakistan

Asia | Middle East | Central Asia | Southeast Asia | The Gulf



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CO-EVENTS

5TH TURKEY - GULF DEFENCE AND SECURITY FORUM

“Unity in Diversity, and Building the Security”

With the changing nature of the use of hard power; fervently encouraged micro-nationalisms, hybrid wars and non-state actors become part of global security architecture. Economic development projects, investment strategies and the formation of geo-economic centers of weight draw the use of hard power into the economic field.

Despite its strong historical and cultural background where strategic dialogue is still developing, it is not possible to exclude Turkey - Middle East or Turkey - Gulf relations in a narrower context from the fragile axis that mentioned above. As the first country to adopt a high-level regular institutional dialogue with its Strategic Partner Status (2008) from outside the region, as well as The US and the EU, Turkey's trade relations with the countries of the region have improved gradually, and the volume of trade between the parties has increased exponentially in this process. Among other factors, the search for a trust-based strategic dialogue plays an important role in these developments, which have produced significant positive results for the two sides. Apart from the brotherhood of religion, language, history and geography, “strategic interdependence and trust building” is the main mental threshold for Turkey - Gulf relations. Proper management of priorities and differences between countries so as not to transform into regional weakness & vulnerability will be possible with a focus on common risks and opportunities.

Developments of the last decade (including the pandemic), that have had equivalent effects of a century have been a critical milestone for the change of production, consumption, growth and conventional power standards, including security and defense. Again, scenarios and preparations for national and international reinterpretation of the immune system and strategic transformation have become a top priority. In this context, “Security Institutions of the Future and Strategic Transformation” for the work to be done and cooperation for each country has become a locomotive priority.

The fifth of the **Turkey - Gulf Defence and Security Forum**, which holds simultaneously with the Istanbul Security Conference, which has been institutionalized as a global brand, aims to make a strategic contribution towards the healthy management of the parameters of strategic interdependence and trust building and the creation of common consciousness.

Main Theme

Unity in Diversity, and Building the Security

Sub-Themes

New Regional Dynamics

Military and Institutional Governance of the Future > Land | Sea | Air | Space

Future Homeland Security Governance and Coordination > Civil Adm. | Law Enforcement | Local Governments



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Future Police and Institutional Governance

Future Smart Cities and Security Governance

Future Gendarmerie and Institutional Governance

Future Diplomacy and Institutional Governance > Public Diplomacy | Sectoral Diplomacy | Cultural Diplomacy

Future Socio-Economic Institutions > Sociological Capabilities and Focusing | Economic Security Governance



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3RD MARINE AND MARITIME SECURITY FORUM 2021

“Turkish Marine Ecosystem: Proactive Policies, Products and Technologies”

The key role in the formation of geopolitical trends and geostrategic advantages is in the seas. Access to the seas is a natural reflection for land states. Based on Immanuel WALLERSTEIN's approach to geoculture, the way to do this is through cultivating maritime consciousness of the states and societies. The most cost-effective solution for accessing raw material resources - in order to produce - and world markets - in order to grow trade - is using seas and waterways even in the 21st century as in the 15th century, when discoveries began to take place. The states that have connection with the seas due to their geography have reached the peak of their power when they were strong at sea. In this context, if the race for dominance over the sea is to be mentioned, it should be emphasized to increase the ability of control over trade.

It is determined in the literature of international relations that global hegemony comes from dominance over seas and waterways. Especially after the Industrial Revolution, with the development of production, trade, logistics and markets, it is seen that Britain in the 19th century and the United States later in the 20th century owed their control over world trade to navy. When it is examined from a geopolitical perspective; It is seen that global and regional power struggles are taking place for the control of energy basins, especially hydrocarbon resources, and the routes that guide the world maritime trade. If the value of energy is mentioned for production today, the importance of the seas for trade can be mentioned at the same level. According to Ken BOOTH, Professor of International Relations, states are developing maritime and naval forces for three main purposes. These are defined as “transport of goods and people”, “diplomatic aims and bringing military elements to the opposite shore” and finally “the utilization of resources within or at the bottom of the sea”. At the beginning of the 21st century, according to the report of the Chamber of Commerce, 98% of the crude oil required by the energy markets, and according to UN sources, 90% of the commercial cargoes are transported by sea. Today, maritime transport contributes approximately 300 billion dollars to the world economy and its 30% sail on Mediterranean basin routes. Considering that the Mediterranean surface area is approximately 1% of the world's seas, the geostrategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean and the measure of the international struggle Turkey faces have been revealed.

Having a peninsula geography, moderate and generous seas with rare qualities, around 200 ports, 8333 kilometers of coastline, and important transportation lines, Turkey's problems -foreign policy based on the destabilized region in northern Syria for access to the Mediterranean and the maritime jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean – that faces today lies in the context of the maritime geopolitics. If this is added to the fact that the contribution of the maritime economy within the country's economy is significantly insufficient in relation to its potential, it becomes clear that Turkey's decisive and confident march in the awakening of cultivating maritime consciousness has a long way to go. Covering the entire maritime areas (including **navies**, **maritime trade fleets**, **ports**, **shipyards** [shipbuilding industry and all applicable engineering branches in ships], **fishing activities**, **seabed mining** [including metallurgy, geology, oceanography, hydrography and seismology], **marine tourism**, **marine law**, marine education institutions and activities, **marine environmentalism**, **supporting sectors** [search and rescue, agency, guidance services, ease of navigational communication, vessel traffic services, marine meteorology, etc.],



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maritime history, maritime literature, cultural and sporting themed activities [water sports, museology etc.] **partnerships with national/international, military / civilian maritime organizations**) with the vision of an integrative approach and an extensive history, changing “marine and maritime” parameters in Turkey and other countries in order to manage healthy cooperation, “**marine and maritime power**” in the field of public awareness needs to be created. It is vital that the relevant studies - as required by global developments - are carried out to new dimensions and **maritime-themed interaction networks** are established between Turkey and other countries.

When approached from the defence and security dimension, the adequacy of the construction of maritime power capabilities to ensure the requirements of the country's geopolitics and to translate its potential into economic prosperity is discussed. In this regard, the efforts of the Turkish Navy Forces and the Turkish Defence Industry Complex in recent years are increasing considerably, but in proportion to the increase of the “strength of the navy”, maritime trade, shipyard and ship building, port and agency services, marine tourism, fisheries, seabed mining and secondary sectors, such as “maritime power” in the basic areas of marine sciences that will guide the creation of academic reports to Turkey is also hosting vital importance.

Although some non-governmental organizations operate in order to provide additional value to the decision centers of Turkey's perspectives on the geocultural aspects of cultivating maritime consciousness; to be able to produce scientific resources that will enable the cultivating maritime consciousness of the nation and the state by raising the awareness of the marine in order to accelerate the cultivating maritime consciousness adventure of Turkey, to evaluate all areas of marine geopolitics and maritime power together reflects the basic expectations.

TASAM National Defence and Security Institute will organize the third **Marine and Maritime Security Forum 2021** this year, which includes a strong motivation to meet this need.

3rd Marine and Maritime Security Forum 2021 with the theme of “**Turkish Marine Ecosystem: Proactive Policies, Products and Technologies**” will be carried out aiming to establish a solid foundation for maritime geopolitics in order to cover all maritime areas, bring regional developments to new dimensions and contribute academically to the construction of sea-based social and political bridges between Turkey and its neighbors.

Main Theme

Turkish Marine Ecosystem: Proactive Policies, Products and Technologies

Sub Themes

New Marine and Maritime Geopolitics

QUAD (Quadruple Security Dialogue: USA, Japan, Australia, India) in the Indo-Pacific

Future and Vision of Turkish Marine Ecosystems

Turkey's Capacity Building in the Black Sea, Mediterranean and Red Sea and Oceans

Structuring of Turkish Navy Forces and Power Distribution/Focusing

New Products and Technologies of Marine Defense Ecosystem (UMV, AUMV etc.)





Turkish Naval Base Scenarios

Turkish Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and Rivalry

New Variables in Marine Geopolitics; Arctic, Canal Istanbul etc.

Impacts and Contributions of Climate Change to our Rights and Interests in Marine Protected Areas and Seas

Turkish Maritime Trade Vision and Future; Perspectives/Analysis

Turkish Nautical Tourism Vision/Future; Perspectives/Analysis

Turkish Ships and Marine Technology Industry Perspectives

Maritime Security; Turkish Defense Industry

Turkish Shipbuilding Capabilities and Shipyard Industry

Turkish Ports, Marina, Ship and Yacht Tourism; Hinterland and Growth Strategies

Turkey Deep Sea Drilling Capabilities



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4TH TURKEY-AFRICA DEFENCE SECURITY AND AEROSPACE FORUM “Security and Defense: Strategic Transformation”

The geopolitical panorama created by the similarities of African countries as well as their differences provides crucial data both for their integration and for their potential for conflict. Both intra-continental and international defence and security strategies need to be determined in a way that does not exploit these qualities of Africa and that primarily treats them as gains in favor of the continent.

Africa comprehensive international military strategies which are feeding the concern that regional security crises on the Continent need to be taken into account. There are views that Africa's inability to properly strengthen its military capacity due to the current problems both in industry in narrow scope and in defence industry in general, provides groundwork for extreme “intrusive” and New “colonialist” tendencies. It is understood that the concept of “terror” will continue to be used as a “pressure factor of systematic manipulation tool of competing states.” Policies that prioritize “structural compatibility” towards development and security issues, which are also the main causes of the migration problem, can be considered to have the opposite effect and to feed the political and economic crises. Socioeconomic transformation is not independent of security; neither is it independent of science, technology and innovation. In the field of defense, security, it and space exploration, Turkey has a high potential for new strategic projects that are compatible with the Continent's future vision and will contribute to mutual capacity development.

Developments of the last decade (including the pandemic), that have had equivalent effects of a century have been a critical milestone for the change of production, consumption, growth and conventional power standards, including security and defense. Again, scenarios and preparations for national and international reinterpretation of the immune system and strategic transformation have become a top priority. In this context, “Security Institutions of the Future and Strategic Transformation” for the work to be done and cooperation for each country has become a locomotive priority.

In the relations that have reached the “strategic partnership” stage, it is important for Turkey to observe the activities of actors such as the USA and EU, especially China, in the continent with sensitivity and to develop its strategic policies with an open reflex to multilateral negotiations. The fourth of Turkey - Africa Defence Security and Aerospace Forum, where representatives from the defence, security, space sectors and institutions of Turkey and African countries will come together, will be held simultaneously with the Istanbul Security Conference which has been institutionalized as a global brand. The Forum; will continue to contribute strategically to mutual capacity building and strategic cooperation, respond to inventory and ecosystem needs by strengthening its institutionalization.

Main Theme

Security and Defense: Strategic Transformation

Sub-Themes | Cooperation Areas

New Dynamics in Africa

Military and Institutional Governance of the Future > Land | Sea | Air | Space

Future Homeland Security Governance and Coordination > Civil Adm. | Law Enforcement | Local Governments





4TH TURKEY - AFRICA DEFENCE SECURITY AND AEROSPACE FORUM

Future Police and Institutional Governance

Future Smart Cities and Security Governance

Future Gendarmerie and Institutional Governance

Future Diplomacy and Institutional Governance > Public Diplomacy | Sectoral Diplomacy | Cultural Diplomacy

Future Socio-Economic Institutions > Sociological Capabilities and Focusing | Economic Security Governance



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